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BEYOND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Fred O. Smith, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
I never watched the video. The descriptions themselves have always felt 
like enough. Traumatizing enough. Invasive enough. George Floyd, father of 
two, laying on the ground, as an unfazed officer kneeled on his neck for at 
least eight minutes and forty-six seconds.1 He pleaded for his life and cried 
out to his deceased mother until he met his inevitable death.2 His name 
should be said for the record before saying almost anything else. The record-
ing of the chilling final minutes of his life is, in all probability, one of the im-
petuses for this multi-journal Reckoning and Reform Symposium. 
Across the nation, across the world, Floyd’s death sparked vocal cries for 
racial justice, especially in the realm of public safety.3 We have seen such 
pleas erupt before, but the cries of last summer included a broader chorus of 
voices.4 Many, including those of us who call law schools home, found our-
selves questioning whether we were doing enough.5 Doing enough to detoxi-
fy the legal system of white supremacy, subordination, and mass 
incarceration. Doing enough to help exorcise the nation’s persistent racial 
ghosts. 
We might imagine that we, as lawyers and future lawyers, have a special 
role to play when it comes to such questions. The man who kneeled on 
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 1. See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Prosecutors Say Derek Chauvin Knelt on George 
Floyd for 9 Minutes 29 Seconds, Longer Than Initially Reported., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2021, 
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Floyd’s neck got his power to act from law. He was purporting to enforce 
law. The legal system equipped him with the trappings of his office: a badge, 
a uniform, and the societal presumption that citizens and subjects of the 
State were to comply with his every command. That same societal presump-
tion—a presumption that it is sometimes itself deadly to challenge—also 
likely disabled the civilians who initially witnessed Floyd’s death from inter-
vening. This killing was perhaps a local failure. It was perhaps a national 
failure. But it was, without a doubt, a legal failure. Per capita and in total, 
more Americans die at the hands of law enforcement than individuals in any 
other “peaceful and fully developed nation on earth.”6 Civil accountability is 
rare.7 Criminal liability—the conviction of George Floyd’s murderer not-
withstanding8—is rarer.9 
Persistent questions remain both as to how to reckon with racial horrors 
and how to reimagine public safety. Notably, reforms to federal litigation 
have found an important place within some policymakers’ proposed answers 
to those questions. No fewer than three bills have been proposed in Congress 
aimed at eliminating or reforming the doctrine of “qualified immunity.”10 
Indeed, eliminating qualified immunity for law enforcement officials is by 
far the most significant judicial reform that federal lawmakers have proposed 
in the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act. That bill has twice passed in the 
House of Representatives: on a 236–181 vote last summer, and on a 220–212 
vote in March of this year.11 
Qualified immunity operates as a defense in damages suits against gov-
ernment officials, including police officers.12 Most controversially, the doc-
trine protects some officers even when they have violated the Constitution. 
Because the doctrine blocks suits unless an official has violated “clearly es-
tablished” rights, cases often turn on the exact contours of precedent at the 
time a violation occurred.13 Unlawful, unreasonable force is often unaction-
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 7. See id. at 133. 
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charges-breakdown-george-floyd-death/7307746002 [https://perma.cc/U6YL-TF9T]. 
 9. ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 133. 
 10. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020); 
George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. (2021); Ending Qualified 
Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020); Reforming Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4036, 
116th Cong. (2020). 
 11. All Actions H.R.7120 – 116th Congress (2019–2020), CONGRESS.GOV (2020) 
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/WB42-G7BE]; All Actions H.R. 1280 – 117th Congress (2021–2022), CONGRESS.GOV (2021), 
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 12. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 13. See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 
(2014) (per curiam). 
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able in the absence of prior governing legal precedents involving highly simi-
lar facts.14 Further, courts often hold that officials have not violated “clearly 
established” rights without answering whether those officials have nonethe-
less violated victims’ constitutional rights.15 And in turn, because the doc-
trine of qualified immunity stunts the development of constitutional law, 
finding precedents that clearly establish the existence of a right often proves 
elusive.16 This area of law has faced withering critiques rooted in textualism, 
empirical facts, and conceptions of accountability.17 
Qualified immunity, to be sure, is a troubled doctrine that calls out for 
scrutiny and reform. This Essay argues, however, that there are additional 
changes to litigation in federal courts that would more readily facilitate the 
types of structural, systemic changes necessary to reduce state-sanctioned 
violence on a mass scale. Specifically, litigation-minded policymakers and 
advocates should aim to lower the exceptionally high bars (1) to litigation 
against government entities, and relatedly, (2) to suits for injunctive relief. 
As leading academic literature makes clear, the causes of state violence 
are complex, varied, and deeply structural.18 Before any individual officer is 
 
 14. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 
267–268 (2013). 
 15. In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court held that when confront-
ed with qualified immunity defenses, lower courts must first answer whether the alleged con-
duct violated the Constitution, and then answer whether the violation breached a clearly 
established right. This mandatory sequencing proved rather controversial and faced criticism 
in its own right. See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical 
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667 (2009) (contending that although courts often opined about the 
existence of a constitutional violation, these opinions often unnecessarily restricted, rather 
than expanded, rights); Pierre N. Leval, Madison Lecture, Judging Under the Constitution: Dic-
ta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275 (2006) (calling Saucier a “puzzling misadventure 
in constitutional dictum”). In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the Supreme Court 
reversed course, holding that lower courts have the discretion to decline to opine about wheth-
er a constitutional violation has been alleged. Today, courts vary widely with respect how they 
use that discretion, and rarely explain what variables are guiding that discretion in a given case. 
Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 
(2015). 
 16. See Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity After Ziglar v. Abbasi: The Case for a Cat-
egorical Approach, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 431 (2018). 
 17. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 88 
(2018) (arguing that the doctrine “lacks legal justification, and the Court’s justifications are 
unpersuasive”); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 70 (2017) 
(contending that the doctrine’s basic justifications lack empirical and logical support); Fred O. 
Smith, Jr., Formalism, Ferguson, and the Future of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2093, 2095 (2018) (“In recent years, federal courts scholars have undermined some of the 
basic empirical and legal assumptions undergirding qualified immunity . . . .”). 
 18. See ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 11 (observing that a police killing is often wrongly 
perceived “as an individual drama featuring its protagonists rather than as part of a set of larg-
er governmental policies that apply to hundreds of different conflicts that produce attacks”); 
PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017) (examining how stereotyping and 
dehumanization of Black men in culture and law facilitate violence against that group); Amna 
A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1789–90 (2020) 
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positioned to choose whether to kill or injure someone, policymakers have 
engaged in a wide range of decisions that encourage frequent, fraught, and 
unequal contact with and control over Americans. Accordingly, legal chang-
es (including litigation-based reforms) should aim to impact the policy 
choices that bring officers into frequent, fraught, and unequal physical con-
tact with Americans in the first place. Governmental policymakers can make 
decisions of scale in ways that individual officers simply cannot. We should 
aim to craft jurisdictional rules that influence those decisions. 
Part I of this Essay demonstrates the special place that the doctrine of 
qualified immunity has played in congressional proposals about policing re-
form. The Part juxtaposes these proposals, which focus on making it easier 
to hold individual officers accountable, with extant legal literature about 
some of the causes of racially disparate police violence in the United States, 
relying in particular on work by Devon Carbado19 and Frank Zimring.20 I 
argue that while reforming suits against individual officers can serve to en-
hance procedural justice and even reshape systemic incentives, this kind of 
litigation will not tend to unearth systemic, negligent patterns on the part of 
a city or a department. Thus, such suits would, at best, only indirectly deter 
systemic, troubling city policies that promote unlawful violence. Further, 
eradicating qualified immunity would have no effect on suits seeking to en-
join unlawful policies and practices that promote state-sanctioned violence. 
Part II shifts attention to other reforms that are better tailored to sys-
temic or structural reforms. This includes expanding litigation against mu-
nicipalities by, at a minimum, lowering the standard of fault to negligence.21 
This also includes permitting state attorneys general to sue entities with pat-
terns or practices of constitutional violation. 
I. REVISITING THE CENTRALITY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
With increased urgency and volume, many Americans have engaged in 
or witnessed the “vociferous chants and marches that seem to erupt each 
 
(“Police violence is (1) authorized by law, (2) takes various, interconnected forms, (3) that oc-
cur in routine and common place ways, that are (4) targeted along the dimensions of race, 
class, and gender, and (5) constitute and produce our political, economic, and social order.”); 
Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1189 (2017) (as-
sessing the role that law plays in distributing the risk of encountering police violence); Devon 
W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 
1479 (2016) (offering a compelling set of systemic explanations for police violence against 
Black Americans); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3189 (2014) (documenting and critiquing federal underenforcement of 42 U.S.C. § 4141, which 
allows the Department of Justice to sue police departments to stop patterns and practices of 
violations). 
 19. See generally Carbado, supra note 18. 
 20. See generally ZIMRING, supra note 6. 
 21. See generally Jeffries, supra note 14 (advocating for fault liability for government 
officials and entities, including municipalities). 
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summer in cities from Ferguson to Baltimore to Baton Rouge”22 to Minne-
apolis. Proposals for legal reform have been copious and diverse.23 These 
proposed reforms from lawmakers and activists at the federal, state and local 
level have aimed at reducing state-sanctioned violence, increasing accounta-
bility when unnecessary state-sanctioned violence occurs, redressing system-
ic racism, and combinations thereof. Because my primary expertise is the ju-
jurisdiction of federal courts, for the purposes of this short Essay I will focus 
on a narrow sliver of these reforms: proposals in the United States Congress 
that aim to reform civil litigation. 
A. The Prominence of Qualified Immunity 
To date, one feature that proposed bills have in common is their focus 
on opening up civil liability against individual government officials, especial-
ly by way of eliminating or reforming the doctrine of qualified immunity.24 
Because it has twice passed the House of Representatives, the George Floyd 
Justice in Policing Act has proven to be the most successful of these pro-
posals. That bill, among other features, would eliminate qualified immunity 
for law enforcement officials.25 Alongside that bill, federal lawmakers have 
filed other proposals for litigation reform as well: the Ending Qualified Im-
munity Act and the Reforming Qualified Immunity Act.26 The Ending Qual-
 
 22. Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283, 2358 
(2018). 
 23. See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, Democrats to Propose Broad Bill to Target Police Miscon-
duct and Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/us
/politics/democrats-police-misconduct-racial-bias.html [https://perma.cc/N2LU-DSB4]; Derek 
Hawkins et al., 9 Minneapolis City Council Members Announce Plans to Disband Police De-
partment, WASH. POST (June 8, 2020, 6:17 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation
/2020/06/07/george-floyd-protests-live-updates/ [https://perma.cc/QM79-5GKH]; Ray 
Sanchez, Police Reforms Quickly Take Hold Across America. It’s Only Just Getting Started, CNN 
(June 14, 2020, 7:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/14/us/george-floyd-national-police-
reforms/index.html [https://perma.cc/LGE8-ZD39]; Sophia Ankel, 30 Days that Shook Ameri-
ca: Since the Death of George Floyd, the Black Lives Matter Movement Has Already Changed the 
Country, BUS. INSIDER (June 24, 2020, 12:58 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/13-
concrete-changes-sparked-by-george-floyd-protests-so-far-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/4ALR-
NTPR]; Ivan Pereira, Cities Across US Announce Police Reform Following Mass Protests Against 
Brutality, ABC NEWS (June 12, 2020, 3:08 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/cities-us-
announce-police-reform-mass-protests-brutality/story?id=71130499 [https://perma.cc/7ZUV-
XJSA]; Rebecca Klar, Atlanta Mayor Signing Orders to Reform Police Use of Force, THE HILL 
(June 15, 2020, 7:57 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/502861-atlanta-mayor-
signing-orders-to-reform-police-use-of-force-policies [https://perma.cc/356F-S6PE]. 
 24. For an excellent forthcoming description, and critique, of the ways that qualified 
immunity has dominated conversations about reforming federal constitutional litigation, see 
Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity, Sovereign Immunity, and Systemic Reform, 71 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2022). 
 25. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 102 
(2020); George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021). 
 26. Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020); Reforming Quali-
fied Immunity Act, S. 4036, 116th Cong. (2020). 
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ified Immunity Act, first introduced in June 2020, would have wholly “re-
move[d] the defense of qualified immunity” in federal constitutional suits 
against officials acting under color of state law.27 Moreover, the proposed 
Reforming Qualified Immunity Act would prohibit courts from inoculating 
a state or local official from suit unless defendants could affirmatively show, 
with some particularity, that the conduct at issue was authorized by law.28 
Qualified immunity applies to suits that seek damages against most clas-
ses of government officials in their individual capacities. I say “most classes” 
because some officials receive various forms of absolute immunity. For ex-
ample, suits may not be launched against individual prosecutors for conduct 
deployed in their adversarial role.29 Suits against legislators for their legisla-
tive functions are impermissible as well.30 Moreover, damages suits against 
individual judges for their judicial conduct are categorically impermissible.31 
Other officials are generally only entitled to qualified immunity, which 
shields defendants from liability unless their conduct violates a clearly estab-
lished right that a reasonable person would have known of at the time of the 
violation. That standard is traceable to the Supreme Court’s 1982 case Har-
low v. Fitzgerald.32 
Qualified immunity is a high barrier. Consider, for example, the case Jes-
sop v. City of Fresno, in which plaintiffs alleged that officers, upon executing 
a warrant, stole hundreds of thousands of dollars from them for their own 
personal use. 33 Plaintiffs contended that the theft violated their Fourth 
Amendment and substantive due process rights.34 But the Ninth Circuit held 
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, observing that it was 
not clearly established that this type of theft was unconstitutional.35 Remark-
ably, that case arose from a circuit that has been consistently warned by the 
Supreme Court that it apparently does not grant qualified immunity enough. 
In the words of the Supreme Court, it has “repeatedly told courts—and the 
Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high 
level of generality.”36 Overcoming qualified immunity generally requires ei-
 
 27. H.R. 7085. 
 28. S. 4036. Specifically, the proposal would seek to remove the existing doctrine of 
qualified immunity and instead provide that an individual defendant “shall not be liable” if the 
defendant reasonably believed that his or her conduct was lawful and either (1) the conduct at 
issue was “specifically authorized or required” by federal or state law, or (2) a federal or state 
court had issued a final decision holding that “the specific conduct alleged to be unlawful was 
consistent with the Constitution of the United States and Federal laws.” Id. § 4. 
 29. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976). 
 30. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998). 
 31. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978). 
 32. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 33. 936 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2793 (2020). 
 34. Jessop, 936 F.3d at 939. 
 35. Id. at 943. 
 36. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting City & Cnty. of 
San Francisco v. Sheehan,  575 U.S. 600, 613 (2015)). 
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ther a governing appellate case with materially similar facts, or an “obvious” 
violation of a previously articulated legal rule.37 Cases like Jessop help expose 
the consequences this rule has for constitutional accountability. The viola-
tion in Jessop is one that few would condone. And yet, the victims’ constitu-
tional rights were insufficiently clear to merit a remedy. 
B. The Merits of Individual Liability 
Increasing liability against individual officers has at least two primary 
benefits. First, and most notably, this move would reduce the significant gap 
between rights and remedies that currently exists with respect to constitu-
tional adjudication.38 Under extant doctrines, when government officials en-
gage in illegal conduct, there is sometimes no meaningful way to hold the 
officers accountable.39 By way of example, consider the Jessop case again. As 
noted, the aggrieved plaintiffs could not sue the individual officers to recover 
their stolen funds.40 But the barriers to relief did not end there. The claims 
against the city were dismissed because victims may not rely on a theory of 
respondeat superior liability to sue employers for the unconstitutional ac-
tions of their employees.41 Attempts to achieve prospective relief—declaring 
such conduct illegal or enjoining such practices in the future—likely would 
not have been permissible either. Under tightly circumscribed readings of 
Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff may only obtain such relief if he or 
she can demonstrate that she is very likely to experience the same type of 
violation again in the future.42 The net result: “When governmental actors 
offend federal rights, victims are often left with no one to hold accountable 
in federal courts.”43 
Opening any of these avenues to relief then would reduce the rights–
remedies gap and, in the process, arguably help to ameliorate concerns 
among the public that the legal system tends to treat officers as above the 
law. When a community believes that the legal system is built such that ac-
countability perpetually alludes some classes of persons, this deepens a per-
ception that the legal system is plagued by procedural inequality and 
unfairness. And as I have observed elsewhere, “when a sense of procedural 
fairness is illusory, this fosters a sense of second-class citizenship, increases 
the likelihood people will fail to comply with legal directives, and induces 
 
 37. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002). 
 38. See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (2016). 
 39. Id. at 409. 
 40. Jessop, 936 F.3d at 940 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 41. Jessop v. City of Fresno, No. 15-cv-0036, 2017 WL 3264039, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 
2017), aff’d, 936 F.3d 937(9th Cir. 2019). 
 42. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983). 
 43. Smith, supra note 38, at 409. 
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anomie in some groups that leaves them with a sense of statelessness.”44 
Lowering the barrier to individual immunity counters this concern, because 
it means that there are constitutional violations that might receive a remedy 
that otherwise would not receive a remedy at all. That is an improvement 
over the status quo. 
Second, by attaching individual consequences to violating constitutional 
rights, legislation could potentially deter officers from violating the law. This, 
to be sure, is a debatable proposition. Joanna Schwartz, the nation’s leading 
empiricist regarding qualified immunity, demonstrated that when police of-
ficers are found liable for constitutional violations, the resultant judgments 
are virtually always paid by the officer’s employers through indemnifica-
tion.45 This fact surely weakens any claim that holding individual officers li-
able will shape individual decisions by officers, because many of this shift’s 
consequences will be borne out by the taxpayer rather than the individual 
officer. Still, to the extent that officers nonetheless prefer not to have judg-
ments issued against them in their individual capacities,46 lowering the bar to 
individual liability could theoretically have some effect. 
C. Limits of Individual Liability 
While permitting suits against individual officers improves upon a sys-
tem in which constitutional violations often go wholly unremedied, this 
mode of accountability has significant limitations. Well before an officer in-
teracts with a citizen, there is a substantial range of policy choices that have 
encouraged and influenced the interactions. For example, substantive laws 
have defined which behavior should be classified as criminal. Local policy-
makers have also made choices about where officers should focus their time 
and how those officers should be trained. These decisions, among others, are 
systemic choices that suits against individual officers are inadequately 
equipped to influence. 
To make these points more concrete, it is useful to consider the work of 
Devon Carbado, who has written powerfully and clearly about six causes of 
what he calls “blue-on-black violence.”47 The first is a set of social forces (in-
cluding segregation, stereotyping, and permissive Fourth Amendment doc-
trines) that encourage frequent contact and surveillance of Black 
Americans.48 Second is the frequency of “surveillance and contact” that cre-
 
 44. Smith, supra note 22, at 2356. For support of this proposition, see Tom R. Tyler, 
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 350 (2003); 
Monica C. Bell, Essay, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 
2054, 2066 (2017); AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP 7-13 
(2014). 
 45. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014); Joanna C. 
Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1806 (2018). 
 46. See Smith, supra note 17, at 2108–09. 
 47. Carbado, supra note 18, at 1483–84. 
 48. Id. at 1483. 
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ates more opportunities for blue-on-black violence.49 Third, “[p]olice culture 
and training encourages that violence.” Fourth, legal actors and institutions 
interpret that violence as lawful.50 Fifth, qualified immunity dampens oppor-
tunities for accountability.51 Sixth, the reduced accountability “diminishes 
the incentive for police officers to exercise care with respect to when and 
how they deploy violent force.”52 
Addressing these causes requires more than accountability for individu-
al police officers. Individual officers did not invent segregation, stereotyping, 
and racially inflected dehumanization. Individual officers do not decide to 
disproportionately patrol, frisk, or question people of color. Individual offic-
ers do not decide the rules of engagement for physical contact with the citi-
zenry: when officers may legally stop people, or what they may do when they 
stop them. Individual officers do not decide what we label “crime” and when 
we as a society decide to invoke the most violent arm of the state to solve so-
cial ills. (For that matter, individual officers did not make the policy choices 
that have resulted in a nation flooded with firearms, increasing the probabil-
ity that the person any officer is interacting with is armed.)53 
Policy decisions not only help explain the unequal degree of force and 
control in Black communities, but also help explain the unequal degree of 
force and control in the United States compared to other nations.54 As Frank 
Zimring explains in his meticulously researched book When Police Kill, 
“[u]ntil police departments become willing to spend time, money, and man-
agement effort on resolving conflicts without killings, nothing significant 
can happen.” 55 Instead, “[o]nce the value of civilian lives becomes a priority 
for policy planning, a significant number of changes in police protocols, 
training, and evaluation of critical incidents can make changes happen 
quickly and safely.”56 
Reforms centering qualified immunity are not tailored toward shaping 
these kinds of systemic incentives of policymakers. It is not readily apparent 
that, in suits against individual officers, the patterns and practices of the po-
lice department would be germane, admissible evidence at trial. Moreover, 
such reform would not make it easier for courts to enjoin cities’ unlawful 
practices. An injunction can, for example, require a defendant to adopt law-
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1483–84. 
 52. Id. at 1484. 
 53. See Christopher Ingraham, There Are More Guns than People in the United States, 




 54. See ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 247. 
 55. Id. at 219. 
 56. Id. at 219–20. 
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ful practices, policies that can remediate past constitutional violations, and 
even policies that would prevent future violations.57 Failure to comply can 
result in being held in contempt of court.58 By comparison, allowing suits 
against individual officers would impact the incentives of local policymakers 
only indirectly, given that such judgments tend to be paid by local govern-
ments.59 
Relatedly, suits against individual officers would not generally force a 
public airing of systemic problems in police departments, and therefore 
would not necessarily influence democratic dialogue in ways that could en-
courage additional reforms. In Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon’s 2004 
article in the Harvard Law Review, they argued that litigation against gov-
ernmental institutions has increasingly moved to a model that encourages 
active participation by institutional defendants in shaping provisional, roll-
ing remedies to achieve the desired outcomes.60 Because this kind of institu-
tional litigation “expos[es] poor performance as clearly as possible, it opens 
the system to general scrutiny and exposes it more readily to nonjudicial in-
tervention.”61 This approach also serves to untether defendants’ deci-
sionmaking from the political economy that allowed the harms to persist in 
the first place.62 These potent features of litigation against governmental in-
stitutions are less prevalent in cases against individual officers. 
II. FEDERAL COURTS AND SYSTEMIC REFORM 
Beyond altering the doctrine of qualified immunity, are there other judi-
cial reforms that could serve to shape the incentives, knowledge, and, ulti-
mately, actions of policymakers in ways that could meaningfully reduce 
injustices, inequality, and unnecessary death in the criminal legal system? 
Indeed, the seeds of such reforms have already appeared in two pieces of liti-
gation legislation proposed by members of Congress. Unlike the George 
Floyd Justice in Policing Act and the Ending Qualified Immunity Act, the 
proposed Reform Qualified Immunity Act sought to make it easier for indi-
 
 57. See generally OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); 19 FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 47:1 (2019). 
 58. See, e.g., Fryzel v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 719 F.3d 40, 43 (Souter, Circuit 
Justice, 1st Cir. 2013). 
 59. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 60. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litiga-
tion Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1073 (2004). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1062 (“A public law destabilization right is a right to disentrench or unsettle a 
public institution when, first, it is failing to satisfy minimum standards of adequate perfor-
mance and, second, it is substantially immune from conventional political mechanisms of cor-
rection. In the typical pattern of the new public law suit, a finding or concession of liability 
triggers a process of supervised negotiation and deliberation among the parties and other 
stakeholders. The characteristic result of this process is a regime of rolling or provisional rules 
that are periodically revised in light of transparent evaluations of their implementation.”); see 
also Fred O. Smith, Jr., Remediating Resistance, 71 ALA. L. REV. 641 (2020). 
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vidual plaintiffs to bring suits against cities under a theory of respondeat su-
perior liability.63 Moreover, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act con-
tains an innovative provision that would permit state attorneys general, and 
others authorized by State law, to bring suits against agencies that specialize 
in juvenile criminal justice, when such agencies have a demonstrable pattern 
or practice of unconstitutional violations.64 This Part recommends that Con-
gress take the best of both of these proposals. Congress could enact legisla-
tion that permits state attorneys general to sue any state or local law 
enforcement agencies within their jurisdiction that engages in a pattern or 
practice of constitutional violations. Such a reform would open the door to 
systemic change through litigation, while also respecting state autonomy. 
A. Expanding Municipal Liability 
For decades, scholars have argued that plaintiffs should be permitted to 
sue local governments for the actions of their employees65 or, at a minimum, 
for local supervisors’ negligence.66 Typically, nongovernmental defendants 
may be held liable for the acts of their agents.67 This is not the case with re-
spect to local governments however, in light of Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services. There, the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that victims 
could sue local governments for unconstitutional policies.68 The Court sim-
ultaneously held, however, that victims could not rely on a theory of re-
spondeat superior liability to sue local governments.69 Instead, as became 
clear through a series of cases in the 1980s, victims may only sue cities for 
unconstitutional ordinances or regulations, unconstitutional deeply en-
trenched customs, actions directed or authorized by a final decisionmaker 
with final policymaking authority, or deliberate indifference exhibited by a 
final decisionmaker with final policymaking authority.70 
This line of jurisprudence has been widely critiqued as atextual, ahistori-
cal, and an unnecessary exacerbation of the rights-remedies gap.71 Moreover, 
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permitting suits against local governments does not suffer from some of the 
limitations faced by reforms that center on suits against individual officers. 
Permitting suits against local governments on a theory of negligence, for ex-
ample, would tend to produce evidence of illegal patterns. And such evidence 
could form the basis of additional policy forms. In addition, as Charles Epp 
has shown, in other contexts where respondeat superior liability has been 
permitted against cities, monetary judgments (and potential judgments) 
have incentivized local governments to take remedial measures in order to 
decrease risk of harm.72 Reforming municipal liability would be a welcome 
complement to reforming qualified immunity. And if policymakers were 
forced to choose between the two, reforming municipal liability would rep-
resent the more impactful reform. 
Nonetheless, permitting additional damages suits against cities brings 
three significant limitations and costs. First, even if victims of constitutional 
injuries were permitted to sue for damages, this would not necessarily mean 
that victims could seek prospective relief under a broader range of circum-
stances than the extant doctrine given the Supreme Court’s strict interpreta-
tion of Article III.73 This is a significant limitation, because prospective relief 
has often proven to be an indispensable component of solutions aimed at in-
stitutional reform. In areas of American life ranging from mental-health in-
stitutions, to prisons, to local courts, prospective relief has proven 
particularly effective at destabilizing or reforming institutions plagued by 
patterns of widespread violations of the Constitution.74 
Second, suits against local governments come with, perhaps inevitable, 
costs to state autonomy and representative government. A judgment paid to 
a victim of lawless conduct is, potentially, money that will not be allocated to 
improving a school or fixing a dangerous sidewalk at the direction of the 
voters (and taxpayers).75 
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Third, expanding suits against cities would leave significant categories of 
government actors and agencies unaffected. State governments still would 
not be subject to suit, even for the conduct of their agents, such as prison 
guards and other state employees. In some states, even sheriffs are classified 
as state policymakers rather than local policymakers.76 
B. Enlisting State Attorneys General 
The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act seeks to expand federal courts’ 
ability to entertain cases against governmental entities that bear “responsibil-
ity for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juve-
niles.”77 Specifically, the Act seeks to amend 34 U.S.C. § 12601, which reads, 
in part: 
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or 
any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a 
pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or 
employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for the admin-
istration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives 
persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.78 
The Act would amend this provision by allowing “the attorney general of 
any State, or such other official as a State may designate” to “bring a civil ac-
tion in the appropriate district court of the United States to obtain appropri-
ate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”79 
This amendment would be innovative and important for four reasons. 
First, because individual plaintiffs often do not have standing to seek pro-
spective relief,80 equipping an actor that does have standing (i.e., the state) 
with the power to seek this relief is a useful intervention. Second, by permit-
ting such legal challenges against government agencies and municipalities, 
this creates the possibility that relief can directly influence the policymakers 
who shape the criminal legal system, rather than individual officers. Third, 
such suits would have created opportunities for the public documentation 
and airing of violations beyond any single incident. Fourth, unlike an extant 
provision, this amendment does not simply deputize the federal Department 
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of Justice to file suits against policing agencies that routinely violate federal 
law.81 Rather, it deputizes fifty state governments, thereby increasing the ca-
pacity for such suits to be launched against more agencies, while still respect-
ing federalism-based values like comity, local accountability, and local 
expertise. 
The proposed amendment in the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act 
did, however, have a significant limitation. It only would have applied to 
those “with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the in-
carceration of juveniles,”82 instead of applying more broadly to state and lo-
cal agencies responsible for the administration of criminal enforcement and 
corrections. Limiting this innovation to juvenile justice, in a law named after 
an unjustly killed adult, is too small for this moment. 
C. A Path Forward 
Nothing in this Essay intends to suggest that altering qualified immunity 
should be absent from the menu of reforms. Eradicating qualified immunity 
for federal, state, and local law enforcement officials would be a significant 
improvement over the current state of the law. It would dramatically reduce 
the rights–remedies gap and improve perceptions of procedural fairness. 
Further, to the extent that employers ultimately pay judgments through in-
demnification, allowing suits against officers indirectly incentivizes policy-
makers to revisit decisions that result in disproportionate violations. 
Congress should also carefully consider two reforms that have not been 
central to the public and policy conversations around addressing police vio-
lence. First, Congress should expand municipal liability by, at a minimum, 
permitting suits against cities for negligence. This will expand opportunities 
to serve the democratic function of producing public information about vio-
lations beyond any individual incident. As described in Part I, this kind of 
information production is a central feature of successful litigation against 
governmental institutions, as it tends to make continuing without policy in-
tervention by nonjudicial action less tenable. Second, Congress should create 
a cause of action for designated state officials to seek prospective relief 
against state and local law enforcement entities that exhibit a pattern or 
practice of violations. This helps lessen the burden of the often-intractable 
barrier of Article III standing that victims of illegal violence often face when 
they seek injunctive relief as mere private litigants. This would, in turn, pro-
vide more opportunities for courts to provide relief tailored toward remedy-
ing and preventing systemic policies that facilitate police violence. 
*** 
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Law alone cannot deepen our national reservoir of love and empathy. 
Law alone cannot teach us to see each other as humans worthy of, as Monica 
Bell once put it, “safety, friendship, and dreams.”83 But while law cannot 
teach us to love, law can create forums that force us to listen. And law can 
open the door to remedies designed to alter and, where necessary, destabilize 
broken systems. Those goals guide the reforms here. While eradicating 
qualified immunity would open the courthouse doors to more evidence as to 
whether an individual officer should be held accountable for taking some-
one’s life, suits against cities also open the door to accounts about a city’s 
broader patterns, practices, and policies that frequently place officers into 
fraught settings. Moreover, whereas allowing plaintiffs to recover for damag-
es would compensate injured parties, creating avenues for injunctive relief 
would also facilitate judicial mandates that alter those patterns, practices, 
and policies. 
It may well be possible that legal reform should aim even higher when it 
comes to federal judicial reform. But simply eradicating qualified immunity 
is not aiming high enough. 
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